We consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indifference in their preference lists (i.e., each list can be partially ordered). We prove that, in an instance where indifference takes the form of ties, the set of strongly stable matchings forms a distributive lattice. However, we show that this lattice structure may be absent if indifference is in the form of arbitrary partial orders. Also, for a given stable marriage instance with ties, we characterise strongly stable matchings in terms of perfect matchings in bipartite graphs. Finally, we briefly outline an alternative proof of the known result that, in a stable marriage instance with indifference in the form of arbitrary partial orders, the set of super-stable matchings forms a distributive lattice.
Introduction
The classical stable marriage problem (SM) and its many variants have been widely studied in the literature [10, 5, 14] . An instance I of SM involves n men and n women, each of whom ranks all n members of the opposite sex in strict order of preference. A matching is a one-one correspondence between the men and women in I. We say that a (man,woman) pair (x, y) is a blocking pair for M if x prefers y to p M (x), and y prefers x to p M (y), where p M (q) denotes q's partner in M , for any person q in I. A matching that admits no blocking pair is said to be stable. It is known that every instance of SM admits at least one stable matching [3] , and in general there may be many [7] . Moreover, the set of stable matchings for a given instance of SM forms a finite distributive lattice under a natural relation of dominance, denoted (Knuth [10] attributes this result to John Conway). One stable matching M dominates another stable matching M if every man has at least as good a partner in M as he has in M . The man-oriented Gale/Shapley algorithm [3] finds, in O(n 2 ) time, the top element of this lattice, called the man-optimal stable matching. This is the unique stable matching in which each man has his best possible partner (and each woman her worst) among all stable matchings. Similarly, by considering the womanoriented version of this algorithm, we may find the bottom element of the lattice, the woman-optimal stable matching.
The exploitation of this lattice structure has led to the formulation of efficient algorithms for a number of problems associated with SM, for example finding all stable pairs (i.e., determining, for each man m and woman w, whether m and w are partners in some stable matching) [4] , generating all stable matchings [4] , finding a so-called egalitarian stable matching [8] and finding a so-called minimum regret stable matching [4] 1 , and plays a key role in establishing the #P-completeness of the problem of counting stable matchings [7] . Many of these problems arise naturally in practical applications such as large-scale centralised matching schemes. Perhaps the largest and best-known of these schemes is the National Resident Matching Program in the US, which administers the annual assignment of graduating medical students to hospital posts, and employs an extension of the Gale/Shapley algorithm for SM [13] .
A natural generalisation of SM arises when each person need not rank all members of the opposite sex in strict order. It is possible that some of those involved might be indifferent among certain members of the opposite sex, so that preference lists may be partially ordered. We use SMP to stand for this variant of SM, and in such a setting, it may be convenient to refer to a person's (partially ordered) preference list as his/her preference poset. The restriction of SMP in which the indifference takes the form of ties in the preference posets (i.e. each preference poset is a weak order [1] ) is denoted by SMT. If a person q precedes a person r in a person p's preference poset, then we say that p strictly prefers q to r; if q and r are incomparable in p's preference poset, then we say that p is indifferent between them. Irving [6] formulates three possible definitions for stability for SMP. A matching M is weakly stable if there is no couple (x, y), each of whom strictly prefers the other to his/her partner in M . Also, a matching M is strongly stable if there is no couple (x, y) such that x strictly prefers y to his/her partner in M , and y either strictly prefers x to his/her partner in M or is indifferent between them. Finally, a matching M is super-stable if there is no couple (x, y), each of whom either strictly prefers the other to his/her partner in M or is indifferent between them. Clearly a super-stable matching is strongly stable, and a strongly stable matching is weakly stable. The definition of a blocking pair for each of these three stability criteria is analogous to that for SM, and henceforth, the particular stability criterion to which the term applies should be clear from the context.
In practical situations, it is arguable that strong stability is the most appropriate stability definition. For, there appears to be no real incentive for a man or woman to form a blocking pair of a matching if each is indifferent between the other and his/her partner in the matching. Thus there is a sense in which the super-stability criterion is too extreme. However, there is also a sense in which the weak stability criterion is too weak: a man m who strictly prefers a woman w to his partner in a matching might offer a bribe to w if she is indifferent between m and her partner in the matching, to try to tempt w into exchanging her partner for m. Clearly the weak stability of a matching cannot exclude blocking pairs that may arise from this practical case; however the strong stability definition does. The latter stability criterion will be the main focus of this paper.
On the other hand, an example context in which super-stability is relevant is when there is uncertainty in the preference lists. Suppose that, in a stable marriage instance, we wish to find a stable matching (in the classical sense), but for some or all of the participants we have only partial information regarding preferences. In general, each preference 'list' may be expressable only as a partial order, and the particular linear extension that represents a participant's true preferences is unknown. It is not difficult to see that a matching M in an instance I of SMP is super-stable if and only if M is stable in every instance of SMT Men's preferences Women's preferences Figure 1 : An instance of SMT with no man-optimal weakly stable matching.
obtained from I by forming linear extensions of the preference posets in I. Therefore a super-stable matching is one that is stable no matter which linear extensions of the various preference posets represent the true preferences. Also, in practice, ties seem to be the most natural form of indifference. For, if a man is indifferent between one woman w 1 and another woman w 2 , and he is also indifferent between w 2 and a third woman w 3 , then it is reasonable to assume that he is indifferent between w 1 and w 3 (i.e., indifference is 'transitive'). Nevertheless, in this paper our standard definition of indifference allows a partially ordered list for full structural generality, since partially ordered preference lists are the natural relaxation of totally ordered lists.
For a given instance I of SMP, the existence of a weakly stable matching is guaranteed: by resolving the indifference in I arbitrarily (i.e. by forming a linear extension of each preference poset), we obtain an instance I of SM, and it is clear that a stable matching in I is weakly stable in I. (Thus a weakly stable matching for I may be found in O(n 2 ) time, using the Gale/Shapley algorithm.) On the other hand, it is straightforward to construct instances of SMT which admit no strongly stable matching and/or no superstable matching; see [6] for further details. However, Irving [6] presents O(n 4 ) and O(n 2 ) algorithms for respectively determining whether a strongly stable matching and/or a superstable matching exists in a given instance of SMP, and in each case, if such a matching does exist, the appropriate algorithm constructs one.
It is known that, for a given instance of SMP, the set of super-stable matchings forms a finite distributive lattice [15] . However, in the case of weak stability, this structure is absent (under the 'usual' definitions of meet and join -c.f. [5, p.20]) even for SMT: there is an instance I of SMT, containing three men, namely m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , and three women, namely w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , which admits no man-optimal weakly stable matching. This example, due to Roth [13] , is reproduced in Figure 1 (in a preference list, persons within parentheses are tied); the matchings M 1 = {(m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 3 ), (m 3 , w 2 )} and M 2 = {(m 1 , w 2 ), (m 2 , w 1 ), (m 3 , w 3 )} are the two unique weakly stable matchings in I. Since man m 1 has his first-choice partner in M 1 and his second-choice partner in M 2 , whereas man m 2 has his second-choice partner in M 1 and his first-choice partner in M 2 , then no man-optimal weakly stable matching in I exists. However, the structure of the set of matchings that are stable with respect to the remaining stability criterion, namely strong stability, has remained open until now.
The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that, despite an apparent lack of symmetry in the strong stability definition, strongly stable matchings in an SMT instance nevertheless give rise to a finite distributive lattice. This result, presented in Section 2, is obtained by defining an equivalence relation ∼ on the set of strongly stable matchings for a given SMT instance; it is the set of equivalence classes under ∼ which forms the distributive lattice under a dominance relation closely related to . Hence there is convincing evidence that the problems mentioned previously for SM [4, 8] are also polynomial-time solvable for SMT under strong stability 2 .
In Section 3, we give a characterisation of the strongly stable matchings in a given equivalence class in terms of perfect matchings of a suitably defined bipartite graph. One use of this representation is to demonstrate how to generate efficiently the strongly stable matchings in a given equivalence class.
The lattice structure for strong stability in an SMT instance does not carry over to SMP: in Section 4, we construct an example instance of SMP in which the set of strongly stable matchings does not form a lattice.
We also consider super-stable matchings briefly, in Section 5. As previously mentioned, it has been shown that the set of super-stable matchings for an SMP instance I forms a finite distributive lattice [15] . The result is established by noting that there is a set I of instances of SM such that I ∈ I if and only if I may be obtained from I by resolving the indifference in I in some way; as previously noted, a matching M is super-stable in I if and only if M is stable in every member of I. Thus the set of super-stable matchings in I is equal to I ∈I S(I ), where S(I ) denotes the set of stable matchings in the instance I of SM. But each set S(I ) forms a distributive lattice, and since the intersection of distributive lattices is also a distributive lattice, the result follows.
In this paper, we outline an alternative approach which builds on results from Section 2 and leads to the same conclusion, but which avoids using the above intersection argument, and which, we feel, provides a more intuitive picture of the structure of the set of superstable matchings in a given SMP instance. 3 Finally, we present some concluding remarks in Section 6.
Strongly stable matchings form a distributive lattice
In this section we show that the set of strongly stable matchings for an instance of SMT gives rise to a finite distributive lattice. Throughout this section, certain results are proved for SMP (rather than SMT) for greater generality, and also with a view to their exploitation in Section 5.
We begin with a definition which will be useful on a number of occasions henceforth.
Definition 2.1. Let I be an instance of SMP, and let M, M be two strongly stable matchings in I. Construct an edge-coloured bipartite graph, denoted by M ⊕M , as follows: form a vertex for each person in I, and join any two vertices by a red (resp. blue) edge if the corresponding people are matched in M but not M (resp. M but not M ).
It is clear that the connected components of any such graph M ⊕ M are cycles, since everybody is matched in each of M, M .
Our first result states that if some person p has different partners in two strongly stable matchings M, M , then there is an important structural relationship between M and M . Lemma 2.2. Let I be an instance of SMP, and let M, M be two strongly stable matchings in I. Suppose that, for any person p in I, (p, q) ∈ M and (p, q ) ∈ M , where q = q 4 , and p strictly prefers q to q or is indifferent between them. Then there is a cycle in of SMP may be defined as follows. For a given person q, assume that ≺q denotes q's preference poset, where r ≺q s if and only if q strictly prefers r to s. The cost of a matching M for q is 1 plus the number of predecessors in ≺q of pM (q).
M ⊕ M , comprising alternating (man,woman) and (woman,man) pairs involving p, q and q as follows: for some r > 1, there are r people p 1 , . . . , p r in I, all of the same sex, and r people q 1 , . . . , q r in I, all of the opposite sex, such that
Case (i)
Proof. Consider M ⊕ M as defined in Definition 2.1. In this graph, the vertices p, q, q are all in the same connected component G . We claim that there is a sequence p j j≥1 of people in G , all of the same sex, and a sequence q j j≥1 of people in G , all of the opposite sex, such that, for each i ≥ 1, (a). {p i , q i } is a red edge and {p i , q i+1 } is a blue edge.
(b). p i strictly prefers q i+1 to q i , or is indifferent between them.
We prove the claim by induction on i. The base case i = 1 clearly holds with p 1 = p, q 1 = q and q 2 = q . For an induction step, suppose that some k ≥ 1 is given, and assume that the claim is true for i = k. We show that the claim holds for i = k + 1. Person q k+1 is incident to a red edge, {p k+1 , q k+1 } say, such that q k+1 strictly prefers p k+1 to p k or is indifferent between them, for otherwise (p k , q k+1 ) blocks M . Also person p k+1 is incident to a blue edge, {p k+1 , q k+2 } say, such that p k+1 strictly prefers q k+2 to q k+1 or is indifferent between them, for otherwise (p k+1 , q k+1 ) blocks M . This completes the inductive step. Since G is a cycle, q r+1 = q, p r+1 = p and q r+2 = q , for some r > 1. Also, note that for each i ≥ 2, q i strictly prefers p i to p i−1 , or is indifferent between them, for otherwise (p i−1 , q i ) blocks M . The remainder of the proof is split into two cases.
Case (i): p is indifferent between q and q. Then a similar induction to the above (swapping the colours red and blue, and interpreting the indices of each p i , q j appropriately) establishes that, for each i ≥ 1, p i strictly prefers q i to q i+1 or is indifferent between them, and q i strictly prefers p i−1 to p i or is indifferent between them. Hence p 1 , . . . , p r and q 1 , . . . , q r satisfy the required properties.
Case (ii): p strictly prefers q to q. Then the fact that p 1 , . . . , p r and q 1 , . . . , q r satisfy the required properties may be established by considering the argument from the start of the proof up to Case (i), and removing all occurrences of the phrase "or is indifferent between them". The concepts of strict preference and indifference may be defined between matchings, as well as between men and women, as follows. Let M, M be any matchings in I, and let q be any person in I. We say that q strictly prefers M to M if q strictly prefers p M (q) to p M (q). Also, we say that q is indifferent between M and M if q is indifferent between p M (q) and p M (q).
Lemma 2.2 leads to the following theorem, which plays an important role in establishing the lattice structure. We proceed with the definition of the equivalence relation that will be central to our construction of the lattice structure involving strongly stable matchings. Note that ∼ is an equivalence relation, for indifference is transitive in an instance of SMT. However, the transitivity of indifference cannot be guaranteed in an arbitrary SMP instance (we see the consequences of this in Section 4). Definition 2.4 leads to the following proposition, whose proof is immediate from the strong stability definition: Proposition 2.5. Let I be an instance of SMT, and let M, M be two strongly stable matchings in I. Then M ∼ M implies that each woman in I is indifferent between M and M , where ∼ is as defined in Definition 2.4.
Recall from Section 1 the dominance partial order defined on the set of stable matchings in an SM instance, where one stable matching M dominates another, M , if every man has at least as good a partner in M as he has in M . We now give a formal definition of this partial order defined on strongly stable matchings. We may extend to a partial order * defined on equivalence classes as follows. M . We aim to show that (C, * ) is a finite distributive lattice.
In order to establish the existence of a lattice structure, we require to define the meet and the join of two equivalence classes. To this end, we make the following definition: given two strongly stable matchings M, M in an SMP instance I, let U in (M, M ) be the set of men in I who are indifferent between M and M (note that possibly U in (M, M ) = ∅.) Also, by Case (i) of Lemma 2.2, there is a set of women
The following result will be of use in our formulation of a meet operation between two equivalence classes.
Lemma 2.8. Let I be an instance of SMP, and let M, M be two strongly stable matchings in I. Let M * be a set of (man,woman) pairs defined as follows: for each man m ∈ U in (M, M ), m has in M * the same partner as in M , and for each man m / ∈ U in (M, M ), m has in M * the better of his partners in M and M . Then M * is a strongly stable matching.
Proof. Firstly, we show that M * is a matching. Suppose that men m and m both have some woman w as their partner in M * . Without loss of generality, suppose that (m, w) ∈ M and (m , w) ∈ M ; then m strictly prefers M to M or is indifferent between them, and m strictly prefers M to M . Theorem 2.3 applied to the pair (m, w) implies that w strictly prefers M to M or is indifferent between them. But Theorem 2.3 applied to the pair (m , w) implies that w strictly prefers M to M , a contradiction. Hence M * is indeed a matching. Now suppose that M * is blocked by some pair (m, w). Suppose firstly that m strictly prefers w to p M * (m). Then w strictly prefers m to p M * (w) or is indifferent between them. Also, m strictly prefers w to both p M (m) and
Hence m is indifferent between w and p M * (m). Thus w strictly prefers m to p M * (w). Also, m strictly prefers w to p M (m) or is indifferent between them, and m strictly prefers
we have a contradiction. Hence M * is strongly stable.
We denote by M ∧M the set of (man,woman) pairs in which each man m ∈ U in (M, M ) receives the same partner as in M , and each man m / ∈ U in (M, M ) receives the better of his partners in M and M ; by Lemma 2.8, M ∧ M is a strongly stable matching. Note that it is not the case that, in general,
We now present a result along the same lines as Lemma 2.8, which will be of use in our definition of a join operation between two equivalence classes. Lemma 2.9. Let I be an instance of SMP, and let M, M be two strongly stable matchings in I. Let M * be a set of (man,woman) pairs defined as follows: for each man m ∈ U in (M, M ), m has in M * the same partner as in M , and for each man m / ∈ U in (M, M ), m has in M * the poorer of his partners in M and M . Then M * is a strongly stable matching.
Proof. Clearly each woman in W in (M, M ) has the same partner in M * as she has in M . If each man m / ∈ U in (M, M ) is given the poorer of his partners in M and M , then by Theorem 2.3, each woman w / ∈ W in (M, M ) receives the better of her partners in M and M . The remainder of the proof is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 2.8, with the roles of the men and women reversed.
We denote by M ∨M the set of (man,woman) pairs in which each man m ∈ U in (M, M ) receives the same partner as in M , and each man m / ∈ U in (M, M ) receives the poorer of his partners in M and M ; by Lemma 2.9, M ∨ M is a strongly stable matching.
The operations ∧ and ∨ on strongly stable matchings have a number of properties, as indicated by the following lemma. 3 Characterising strongly stable matchings in an equivalence class
In this section we give a representation of the strongly stable matchings in an equivalence class in terms of perfect matchings of a bipartite graph. We begin with a definition which will feature in the construction of this graph.
Definition 3.1. Let I be an instance of SMT. For any persons p, q in I, not both of the same sex, let T (p, q) denote the set of people tied with q in p's preference list.
Note that in the above definition, T (p, q) = ∅, since q ∈ T (p, q). We now define the bipartite graph that forms the basis of our equivalence class representation. Definition 3.2. Let I be an instance of SMT, and let M be a strongly stable matching in I. Define the equivalence graph, H M = (V, E), of M as follows: let V = U ∪ W , where U, W are the sets of men and women in I respectively, and
For a given equivalence class C, the perfect matchings in the corresponding equivalence graph are exactly the strongly stable matchings in C, as the following result indicates. Proof. Suppose that M is strongly stable and M ∼ M . Let (m, w) be any (man,woman) pair in M . Then m is indifferent between w and p M (m), so that w ∈ T (m, p M (m)). Also, by Proposition 2.5, w is indifferent between m and p M (w), so that m ∈ T (w, p M (w)). Hence (m, w) ∈ E, so that M is a perfect matching in H M .
Conversely suppose that M is a perfect matching in H M . Suppose that some unmatched (man,woman) pair (m, w) blocks M . Now m is indifferent between p M (m) and p M (m). Also, w is indifferent between p M (w) and p M (w). Hence (m, w) blocks M , a contradiction. Thus M is strongly stable in I. Clearly M ∼ M .
A consequence of the representation of Theorem 3.3 is that strongly stable matchings may be efficiently generated in a given equivalence class. More specifically, we now show that, having found a strongly stable matching M in an SMT instance I of size n (which may be achieved in O(n 4 ) time [6] ), we may generate all of the remaining strongly stable matchings in [M ] with a delay of O(n 2 ) time per matching. The set of perfect matchings in a bipartite graph G may be generated efficiently [2] : once an initial perfect matching in G has been found (in this case, such a matching is M ), all of the remaining perfect matchings in G may be generated with a delay of O(n 2 ) time per matching. The whole enumeration process takes O(n 3 ) space. the women's side. In general, this is a necessary condition for the lattice structure to be absent. For, if indifference occurs on one side only, then the strong stability criterion is equivalent to the super-stability criterion, and super-stable matchings in an arbitrary SMP instance do form a lattice [15] .
Super-stability
In this section, we briefly outline an alternative strategy from the one used by Spieker [15] to show that the set of super-stable matchings for an SMP instance forms a finite distributive lattice. The basis of our method is the following lemma, which demonstrates that if a person has different partners in two super-stable matchings, then he/she cannot be indifferent between them. This useful property of super-stable matchings is not stated explicitly in [15] . 
Conclusions and open problems
As mentioned previously, it remains open as to whether the lattice structure for SMT under strong stability can be exploited so as to yield efficient algorithms for the problems of finding an egalitarian strongly stable matching, a minimum regret strongly stable matching and all strongly stable pairs (i.e. determining, for each man m and woman w, whether m and w are partners in some strongly stable matching) for a given SMT instance. Although we have suggested a strategy for listing strongly stable matchings in a given equivalence class under ∼, the general problem of listing all strongly stable matchings in an SMT instance also remains open. Each of these four problems is also open for SMP under superstability, but the existence of a lattice structure, and Lemma 5.1 in particular, provides strong evidence that all four problems are efficiently solvable. On the other hand, the situation for SMP under strong stability is likely to be different, in view of Section 4. Indeed, the problem of deciding whether a given instance of SMP admits a strongly stable matching is NP-complete [11] . In the case of weak stability however, the efficient solvability of three of the aforementioned problems is known to be unlikely. The problems of finding an egalitarian weakly stable matching and a minimum regret weakly stable matching in an SMT instance I are both NP-hard, and are not approximable within n 1−ε , for any ε > 0, where n is the number of people in I, unless P=NP [9, 12] . In addition, the problem of determining, for a given SMT instance and a given man m and woman w, whether m and w are partners in some weakly stable matching, is also NP-hard [12] . Each of these results holds in the restricted case that every tie is of length two, there is at most one tie per preference list, and the ties occur in the preference lists of one sex only (these conditions holding simultaneously). Finally, the question as to whether all weakly stable matchings in a given SMT instance may be generated efficiently (in the sense described in Section 3) remains open, though we conjecture that the answer will be in the negative.
